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Objective of the paper
The aim of the International Development Academy (IS Academy) on Fragile States is to 
better understand the processes of socio-economic recovery and the roles of formal and 
informal institutions in conditions of state fragility. In so doing the IS Academy will explore 
effective locally anchored strategies to support economic security, including food-security 
and resilient livelihoods, in conditions of state fragility. 
This scoping paper has been prepared to provide a conceptual point of departure for the 
work of the IS Academy. There is a wide range of organisations involved in the IS Academy 
and also a broad range of contexts in which the research will be undertaken. In light of such 
diversity, this paper has been prepared to ensure a modicum of common ground for the 
IS Academy and thereby provide a basis for fruitful intellectual exchange within the research 
group of the IS Academy and clear entry points for policy support among the wider stakeholders 
in the Dutch NGO community and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This paper 
has also been prepared in order to inform other stakeholders in the wider humanitarian 
research community and practitioners about the work of the IS Academy and thereby initiate 
a dialogue regarding possible collaboration and synergy with other research, policy formation 
and evaluation initiatives.
This scoping paper has been prepared on behalf and with the participation of the IS 
Academy, which is a programme initiated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The IS 
Academies are partnerships between departments at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
university departments, involving a number of interconnected activities around a policy 
theme. The IS Academy on Fragile States is a collaboration of academic, governmental and 
non-governmental actors. These include Fragile States and Peacebuilding Unit of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Cordaid, ICCO, Netherlands Red Cross (NRC), Oxfam Novib and ZOA 
Refugee Care. 
Disaster Studies at Wageningen University is providing the academic direction and the 
overall coordination of the IS Academy on Fragile States, while academic partners from other 
academic institutions - Maastricht School of Management, the Institute of Social Studies, 
University of Utrecht and University of Groningen, as well as other Wageningen chairs/
groups - will be involved in the pool of supervisors of the academy. The work of the Academy 
includes PhD and short-duration research, as well as a range of activities to enhance 
exchange and mutual learning.
4Why focus on fragile states?
The focus on fragile states is a response to failures in the past to define ‘the problem’ that is to 
be addressed in a range of contexts with a variety of labels, including states in chronic conflict, 
post conflict recovery, transitional states, collapsed states. A point of departure for the work of 
the IS Academy is that it is more important to recognise and come to terms with the prevailing 
uncertainty that these myriad labels suggest than to try to find yet another structure to define 
these varied but related concepts/contexts. ‘Fragility’ is associated with flux, but there is little 
consensus about where change is headed and what should be done. At the same time, there 
is a consensus that something must be done. This combination of uncertainty and ambiguity 
with a normative commitment to act is the conundrum that the IS Academy seeks to explore. 
This consensus that ‘something must be done’ can be broken down to contrasting points of 
departure:
•	 The	humanitarian	community	is	concerned	with	states	where	‘fragility’	means	that	the	
state cannot or will not shoulder responsibility to protect the lives and well-being of the 
population within its borders. The need for action is clear, but the uncertainties about 
the direction of change imply that the nature, scale and timeframe for humanitarian 
commitments are uncertain, as are interfaces with development agendas. Confronted 
with the indefinite nature of fragility, humanitarian programmes increasingly seek to 
contribute to enhancing livelihoods and strengthening institutions, without losing 
sight of providing services to those most in need. However, the diversity in conditions 
and lack of consensus on how to respond to these challenges leads to uncoordinated 
programming and trial and error methodologies. 
•	 The	development	community	is	confronted	with	situations	where	the	need	for	
development is clearest but most ambiguous. Fragility is not considered to be an 
acceptable condition for the state, but at the same time, fragile states cannot apply 
most of the tools in the development toolbox. Indeed, the tools of the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness and other core agreements are out of reach, and a stratification of 
countries into those which can and cannot live up to the basic tenets of the declaration 
would effectively place a large number of countries in the ‘fragile’ category. The 
benchmarks and modalities of effective development, including conditional assistance, 
local ownership, accountability and good governance have to be reinvented for fragile 
situations. The dichotomies between what is known about what should be done and 
what can be done creates conundrums for deciding what will be done .
•	 For	the	international	community	beyond	the	aid	sector,	the	security	threats	posed	by	
fragile states have led to an increasing quest for integrated and coherent approaches to 
development and security. The Netherlands government aims for an optimal integration 
of defence, development and diplomacy, and is devoting growing resources to 
strategies such as Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programmes 
and Security Sector Reform, alongside more conventional development objectives. 
Interveners are increasingly asking for complex levels of coordination and articulation of 
different approaches . Neither the organs of international response, nor the institutions 
within fragile societies may be able to handle this ambitious ‘coherence’ agenda. 
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‘reality check’ on past models of political systems. Fragile situations challenge the 
demarcations between normality and exceptionality that have guided theories of state 
building and much of the organization of societies. The fragility of states discredits the 
Westphalian world order and draws attention to profound ambiguities regarding if and 
how normal notions of state sovereignty and state-society relations should be applied 
(Boege et al 2008). The academic discourse, primarily led by political science and 
international relations, has largely focused on the need to find alternatives to the given 
assumptions of the past (Di John 2006). 
•	 The	climate	change	and	disaster	risk	reduction	communities	have	been	concentrating	
on searching for convergence in their own agendas and have therefore also been slow 
in recognizing that disasters and climate change are occurring in areas in crisis and/
or with weak governance structures. An exception is the discourse on links between 
climate change and insecurity, which is based on rather weak empirical findings. 
Proposed responses to these security concerns have been of questionable relevance 
in fragile states. There is a strong statist bias in most climate change mitigation and 
adaptation plans, with very ambitious checklists of things that government ‘must do’ 
which bear little resemblance to current understanding of what fragile states ‘can do’. 
The gap between what can be done and assumptions about what ‘must’ be done is 
growing and there are few signs of an equivalent to the ‘good enough governance’ 
concept emerging in climate change circles. 
This attention to uncertainties about the role of the state has provided a useful basis for 
overcoming some of the tunnel visions inherent in the aid discourses, but sometimes 
distracts from the need to understand the non-state factors which are at play. State-building 
is not the only agenda in situations of post- and chronic conflict. Fragile states differ 
from stronger states in that markets and conflict severely constrain the ability of states to 
determine their own agendas. Analyses of the political economy of fragility, and indeed, also 
the strengths that exist in fragile states, has provided an important contrast to checklists 
of steps required to achieve ‘good governance’ in states that are characterised as ‘poor 
performers’ in the more normative literature on aid effectiveness (Wimpelmann 2006). 
Attention to the political economy of fragile states thus draws attention to how private 
sector actors are very much a part of the processes underway in fragile states and eventual 
recovery. There are attractive markets which attract investments despite (or even because of) 
the weak rule of law. This includes illicit activities, security services and construction. At the 
same time, aid promoting private sector investment is sometimes driven more by unrealistic 
optimism about silver bullet solutions and disbursement targets than an understanding 
of prevailing market opportunities and obstacles. The specific roles that can be played by 
international corporate actors - often inspired by corporate social responsibility and defined 
in corporate codes of conduct - are difficult to define in relation to local private actors, often 
small-scale and providing much local employment, and public service actors and in view of 
weak, non-existent or grossly outdated economic state policies and control mechanisms. 
Glaring examples include natural resource extraction or other forms of asset stripping which 
can provide quick profits but undermine longer term development. Increasingly, concerns 
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fragility of some states through land grabbing, suggesting the need for codes of conduct that 
go beyond the private sector (Von Braun and Meinzen 2009). 
Human Security framework
The IS Academy for Fragile States works with the human security framework. The concept 
of human security emphasises the rights and needs of vulnerable people. The framework 
refers not only to their physical security but also to their social, economic and political 
security. In fragile states, people often have to cope without the protection of the state. 
Daily life during humanitarian emergencies is often marked by uncertainty, instability, and 
vulnerability to unexpected or unavoidable shocks. When moving from reconstruction to 
development, these multiple vulnerabilities and insecurities need to be addressed. Vicious 
circles of social exclusion and increasing insecurity can sometimes be broken by initiatives 
designed to advance local-level security and resilience at the same time as building better 
local institutions and addressing human rights. 
Human security means creating structures and enabling environments that provide building 
blocks for survival, dignity and resilient livelihoods. The IS Academy stresses the need to 
understand the structures that enable or block local capacities. This requires engaging with 
the way assets (financial, social, natural, physical and human) are distributed, with the 
entitlements that households can draw upon in pursuing livelihoods, but also with policies, 
formal and informal institutions, infrastructure, services and markets. Economic, political 
and religious power relations at different levels shape access and distribution. There is 
always a risk that the most vulnerable, often those without strong family or community 
attachments, are excluded from economic recovery, as well as aid programmes, with the 
paradox that the most needy sometimes end up - in the aftermath of humanitarian and post-
war reconstruction programmes - more vulnerable than before.
The Academy has a specific concern with vulnerable and poor populations, both rural and 
urban, given that they often face severe difficulties in restoring their livelihoods after war. 
However, the Academy captures local economic recovery in a wider sense. Dynamic local 
economies, with development opportunities for poor people, also require entrepreneurs and 
middle class consumers as well as state economic policies. The Academy is interested in 
local economic recovery, ranging from privately initiated economic growth and employment, 
people’s livelihood strategies and the revitalization of economic institutions. In this, it has 
a special concern for social protection, or those practices or interventions that ‘respond to 
levels of vulnerability, risk and deprivation which are deemed unacceptable within a given 
polity or society’ (Norton in Harvey et al, p.9).
In order to fruitfully address these issues and to connect the socio-economic and political-
institutional aspects of fragile states the IS Academy focuses in particular on the following 
four dimensions of human security:
7•	 Food	security,	referring	in	particular	to	how	people	struggle	to	ensure	regular	access	to	




respond to natural disasters
•	 Political	security,	referring	in	particular	to	political,	institutional	and	governance	
structures that enable or block local coping capacities and resilience
This paper looks at the nature of human security in fragile states through the lens of how 
aid intervention and ongoing social, political and economic processes influence the state, 
the institutions of civil society and the private sector and how this effects the economic and 
food security of the population. In the IS academy we will treat presuppositions about these 
issues as discourses that shape strategies of donors, agencies and private actors. Discourses 
are more or less coherent sets of references that frame the way we understand and act upon 
the world around us. The effect of discourse is that certain ways of understanding society, 
including its organization and the distribution of power, become excluded whereas others 
attain authority. Hence, discourses are mindsets that have very tangible effects on the way 
realities can evolve. We can study discourses by making the presuppositions in donor, agency 
and people’s strategies explicit and explore their implications in the practice of interventions 
and development (Hilhorst 2003).
The following section of this paper considers the concepts and labels that have been used 
over the years to describe fragile states, institutions in fragile states, socio-economic 
processes and the aid interventions that have been applied within them over the past two 
decades. The section underscores that current terminology primarily reflects the needs of 
observers (presumably from a non-fragile state) to define how these states fit into prevailing 
academic models and prospective aid modalities. Seen together they do not present an ever 
more accurate, useful or more comprehensive set of concepts, so much as a struggles to 
grasp an obviously multifarious and slippery collection of intervention models and country 
contexts. 
Section three proposes an alternative framework for analysis that brings academic and aid 
discourses together by looking at fragility and aid as related to human, organisational and 
institutional capacities. The vulnerabilities of individuals, households and organisations, and 
the ways that weak institutions reinforce and perpetuate these vulnerabilities are analysed. 
This has been chosen as a way to highlight what fragility consists of in a way that (hopefully) 
can prove meaningful and accessible for using within a dialogue between academics and aid 
practitioners.
Section four summarises what is known about socio-economic security in fragile states with 
an emphasis on the linkage between livelihoods and food security. The aim is to map how 
the ‘bottom line’ of the research of the IS Academy can be congruent with most pressing and 
8fundamental concerns (the bottom line) of the residents of fragile states and to provide ideas 
for how concretely to link the concerns of state building with the humanitarian imperative of 
ensuring that human suffering is minimised.
This paper concludes with a set of overarching hypotheses and methodological frameworks 
for the research of the IS Academy. These hypotheses are intended to provide a basis for 
discussions within the IS Academy about how the concepts and approaches outlined in this 
paper relate to the empirical realities they are facing in the various research sites.
Box 1. How do we look at interventions?                                                             
                                                                                                                                                  
Development programmes predominantly reflect notions of modern organisations 
and the linearity of planned intervention. According to this model, development 
interventions follow the policy cycle model, in which policy is the systematic pursuit 
of goals and the end result of a purposive course of action (Colebatch 2002:49). 
Development policy is about choosing objectives, but also about the means to reach 
these, and the actors to be involved. It has been amply demonstrated in the past 
decades that the linearity of planned interventions is not how it works in practice. 
In reality, development interventions are socially constructed. They can be productively 
portrayed as arenas where issues, resources, values and representations are 
contested. Intervention policies are constructed by the participants in the process, 
which begins long before the actual plan gets produced. One important question 
is whether interventions are actually meant to do what they proclaim, or whether 
they are meant to be implemented at all. Policy statements often have a highly 
symbolic value and may hide different objectives. Many international socio-economic 
interventions in fragile situations are loaded with implicit expectations towards 
enhancing security or thwarting unwanted migration flows. Part of their genesis can 
often be explained by the desire of agencies to expand their domain of intervention. 
Once an intervention is launched it is translated and negotiated all the way down to 
the level of implementation. Actors invest them with their own meanings and the 
interlocking interests they want the intervention to serve. As a result, intervention 
processes do not happen in a linear fashion, but have all kinds of directions, ruptures, 
closures and moments of ‘fanning out’. Hence, we view aid interventions not as the 
chain of implementation of pre-defined plans but the negotiated product of a series of 
interfaces between different social fields (Long and van der Ploeg 1989).
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Concepts and labels for understanding  
and addressing fragility
Defining the nature of the state
The various labels applied to states that are now most frequently referred to as ‘fragile’ have 
changed over time. The focus of the IS Academy is not on rehashing the debate around 
the what label or conceptual political science framework is most appropriate, but it is 
nonetheless important to start by briefly summarising the antecedents of the fragile state 
discourse, both in terms of how states are perceived and how aid interventions are framed. 
Allowing for a fair degree of overlap and disjuncture, the following labels have been applied 
over the past two decades for what the aid discourse today generally refers to as ‘fragile 
states’:
•	 Collapsed	states
 When the concept of fragile states originally entered the aid discourse in the early 
1990s they were most frequently referred to as collapsed states. This was motivated by 
the realisation that something had to be done to deal with places where conventional 
assumptions about having a state to build were no longer appropriate, e.g., Somalia, 
Liberia, East Timor and Kosovo (Zartman 1995). These terms were used to draw 
attention to the fact that the rules of engagement had to be very different. Robert 
Kaplan (1997) presented this within a dramatic vision of growing global chaos. His de 
facto fear-mongering elicited a counter-reaction among researchers who questioned 
Kaplan’s reductionist and deterministic assumptions about what were clearly a 
far more complex set of phenomena (Di John 2006; Call 2008). Many researchers 
have pointed out that these sloppy labels are frequently applied to an extremely 
heterogeneous and dynamic set of countries (Brinkerhoff 2007). Duffield (2002), for 
example, has explored how these states do not suggest an absence of order, but rather 
a new form of order based on transnational networks wherein the accoutrements of 
traditional states are no longer needed. 
•	 Failed/weak	states
 The need for an alternative to the collapsed state label became apparent as weak 
or otherwise problematic states, such as Afghanistan or North Korea, began to be 
referred to as ‘collapsed’ simply because they were not seen to be fully legitimate and 
were failing to perform in many of their basic functions. The somewhat more nuanced 
label of failed or weak states thus entered the discourse. The focus on state failure 
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was also accompanied by a realisation that the failure of states to shoulder normavite 
responsibilities was not an absence of governance but rather a part of the changing 
security complex that created a demand for space where illicit trade and political 
movements could become established and thrive (Duffield 2001). Addressing failure 
was therefore not a matter of filling a vacuum but rather a process of rooting out 
undesirable elements as part of the new security agenda that prevails today. 
•	 States	in	transition
 A problem with these labels for many actors was that they were static and in some 
respects an excuse for bypassing existing institutions rather than dealing with the 
problems of state structures that existed but were failing in their basic tasks (see, 
for example, Lister 2005). There is clear evidence that fragile states are dynamic 
environments where actors are recreating their own institutions, relations and 
organisations, and where there is a major role for aid to act as a catalyst for these 
efforts (Brinkerhoff 2007). Ignorance of existing societal dynamics has been 
recognised as encouraging misguided attempts to start from scratch in state-building 
(Boege et al 2008). The transitional perspective is a reaction to journalistic images 
of barbarism and chaos in that the emphasis is instead placed on planned change, 
whereby societies and states are rebuilt, usually with a leading role played by the 
international community. In the aid discourse references to fragility are currently 
often linked to statements about sequential transition processes (e.g., OECD/DAC 
2007; Oxford Policy Management and the IDL Group 2008). The unique nature of 
political and economic development in a given state may be overlooked. In what may 
be interpreted as a recognition of the need to focus on the institutions that exist in 
a given country, current approaches to transition promoted by the OECD and others 
emphasise strongly the need for comprehensive ‘whole of system’ and ‘whole of 
government’ approaches (see www.3c-conference2009.ch/) as an alternative to the 
piecemeal approach that has until now characterised most efforts to promote recovery. 
This ‘whole of...’ discourse assumes that it is the fragmented and weak international 
commitment to recovery that leads to protracted crisis. The core problem with such a 
paradigm is that it may also lock aid into a faith in planned development, rather than 
an acknowledgement of the uncertainties that accompany the flux of change.
•	 Fragile	states
 This term does not entirely avoid the problematic nature of the other labels, but 
is currently largely preferred since it highlights both the need for action (to lessen 
fragility) while also flagging the risks of descending into the category of failed states 
(the uncertainty inherent in the term ‘fragile’). It also tends to be used with a stronger 
focus on internal processes and recognition of the forces that reproduce fragility, rather 
than the focus on planned interventions and internationally driven reconstruction 
that characterises the discourse on transition. A problem with the term is that it 
is perceived as a pejorative categorisation which can gloss over the strengths and 
fragilities that exist in all states, whether they are included in the standard lists of 
fragile states or not. 
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The term fragile states is thus problematic in that it hides a large diversity of situations, 
ranging from countries that are in the process of recovery after conflict and are re-building 
their political and economic institutions to countries where low levels of state effectiveness 
and economic development seem to be chronic, as well as countries where state-building 
and economic development are hampered by protracted conflict. There is also diversity 
within countries, as fragility may be typical for some regions or particular state sectors. So-
called ‘fragile’ states can in some respects be very strong, or may be strong in some parts of 
their territory, but fragile and contested in other parts of the country. Colombia, Guatemala 
and Uganda are cases in point, and the gradual retreat of state institutions from declining 
neighbourhoods many mega-cities in the world also comes to mind. A concern of the IS 
Academy is to ensure that the categorisation that the term ‘fragility’ suggests should open 
fields of inquiry and not close them.
Fragile states can also be considered as a challenge to conventional development thinking. 
When states are weak or contested this obviously conditions processes of recovery and 
places special challenges on economic reconstruction, such as:
•	 Where stability has been achieved, it is often patchy and non-linear, with high risk of 
recurring violence and high levels of criminality and sexual violence.
•	 Uneven levels of state capacity can create disconnects between different levels of the 
state.
•	 International aid generally consists of pockets of services, often organised in parallel to 
state structures.
•	 Ongoing acute (humanitarian) needs and a high level of food-insecurity exist, 
alongside the challenges of addressing development problems.
•	 The struggle to manage day-to-day governance takes precedence over the need for an 
overall planning process with which to align interventions, resulting in weak coherence 
and local ownership.
•	 Institutions are in flux, leading to shifting alliances and power constellations which 
are difficult to understand and meaningfully respond to. Conditions may be favourable 
to political and economic entrepreneurship that, whilst including potential seeds for 
change, may also provide opportunities for elite capture of resources and development 
assets.
The discourse on collapsed, failed and fragile states has, at a minimum, led to a wide 
consensus that there must be engagement with state structures, no matter how problematic 
they may be (Call 2008). It should ultimately be stressed that the process of labelling, 
regardless of the label chosen, has been criticised as distracting donor attention from the 
need to identify where capacities exist, where they need to be strengthened, where they need 
to be built from scratch, and above all, what sequences are needed when it is unclear where 
to start (see e.g., Grindle 2005). Labels can encourage an illusion that planning is a matter 
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of choosing the right aid effectiveness blueprint rather than investing in empirical analyses 
of the nature of capacities, norms and fragility in any given state (Call 2008; Wimpelmann 
2006). Emerging alternatives to these concepts include calls for recognition of ‘hybrid 
political orders’ (Boege et al 2008) and ‘institutional multiplicity’ (Hesselbein et al 2006) 
which in some way echo recognition among aid practitioners that ‘contiguum’ of approaches 
is needed to address humanitarian and development needs simultaneously rather than 
sequentially. The most important aspect of this shift has been a growing recognition that 
there is no blank slate. Institutions exist, political processes are underway and prevailing 
norms are more likely to guide local expectations about the state-building process than the 
goals of the international community to take advantage of the ‘opportunity’ of state fragility 
to introduce secular parliamentary democracy, free market ideals or other accoutrements of 
‘good’ liberal governance. 
Interplay between fragile states and globalisation
The approach proposed in this paper highlights the local perspective, but retains explicit links 
to global factors. Researchers such as Mark Duffield (2001) and Carolyn Nordstrom (2004) 
have stressed how fragility and ‘durable disorder’ are generated in a symbiotic relationship 
between fragile and non-fragile states. This perspective disputes the assumption that fragile 
states are a temporary anomaly and draws attention to the need to look at recovery processes 
in the perspective of the web of economic and political relations that link fragile states to 
transnational structures. These concepts stress how fragility is not just a lack of capacities, 
but is also a functional and durable dimension of prevailing transnational systems.
The focus of the IS Academy on livelihoods and food security provides opportunities to 
analyse examples of this process in specific spheres and thereby transcend the oversimplified 
and grossly inaccurate claims that food security is primarily related to local food production 
and productivity. The recent ‘food crisis’ may illustrate the transnational factors shaping food 
security within and beyond fragile states. It is a clear and dramatic example of how global 
trends can have impacts on both political instability and household socio-economic security. 
It is also an example of how response, in the form of promoting increased use of agricultural 
inputs for high yielding varieties, may end up being a technological change agenda that 
implicitly ‘picks winners’ rather than addressing the actual landscape of risk and vulnerability. 
Furthermore it is an agenda that is implicitly reliant on organisational capacities, in the form 
of national agricultural research and extension structures, capacities that are extremely weak 
in fragile states and where evidence shows that they cannot be rebuilt without long-term 
investments. 
As noted above, fragile states attract less than altruistic investment in the form of 
transnational land-grabbing and resource exploitation. Analysis of these investments is 
another important aspect of the interplay between fragile states and globalisation. The 
‘non-DAC donors,’ such as China, Kuwait, Iran and Venezuela are particularly active in 
fragile states, often with investments related to gaining access to such resources and/or 
promoting alternative political ideologies. There is a growing literature on the role of China in 
international investment in fragile states. 
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Defining the nature of institutions and socio-economic processes 
in fragile states
Socio-economic processes are often thought to come to a standstill during crisis or to 
become functionally integrated into forces driving the crisis. Implicit in many descriptions of 
fragile states is the notion that the normal economy collapses. Production processes, capital 
investments, import and export, transportation of resources and stable currencies are all 
assumed to disappear. This imagery portrays the normal economy as being entirely replaced 
by economies of violence. 
Aid has been criticised for being part of this process. The 1980s and 1990s saw a number 
of influential studies focusing on the many large and small-scale ways in which aid can fuel 
economies of violence (Duffield, 1993, Keen 1994). Economies of war refer to the systems 
where the production, mobilisation and allocation of resources are organised to benefit from 
and even sustain violence (Le Billon 2001, Kaldor 1999). These economies are intricately 
linked to global networks of drugs, arms and human trafficking. Although fully unfolding in 
war, these economies are the continuation of informal practices of globalised economies 
linking fragile and non-fragile states where violence regulates people’s livelihoods, in most 
cases without escalating into full war (Duffield 2001) Actors and institutions, like markets 
and local entrepreneurs are likewise often considered to be fully incorporated in the logic 
of conflict. Fragile economies are described as being dominated by corruption and criminal 
activities. 
 An alternative strand of parallel research and writing has consistently pointed to the coping 
strategies of people during conflict and the resilience of institutions during conflict. Anderson 
and Woodrow famously stated in 1993 that ‘Disaster victims have important capacities 
which are not destroyed in a disaster. Outside aid to these victims must be provided in 
ways that recognise and support these capacities if it is to have a long-term effect. When 
relief assistance is given without recognition of these capacities, it can undermine and 
weaken them, leaving those whom it is intended to help even worse off than they were 
before’ (Anderson and Woodrow, 1993:136). In more recent years research has revealed the 
continuity in economic activity although often very localised (Levine and Chastre, 2004, 
Longley, et al 2006). There is thus a flip-side of war economies in the continuation of the 
normality of economies of production, transactions and distributions that we may call 
the economies of survival during crises (Hilhorst 2007). Although economies may largely 
collapse during war, people hold on to normality as much as they can and continue planting 
their fields and trading their products. Likewise, certain formal and informal institutions 
continue to function or provide services. Informal safety nets continue to be operative to 
some extent. Where national governments have collapsed or are party in the conflict, line 
ministries in many cases nonetheless continue to be responsive to people’s needs, even 
though their services have become severely restricted (Christoplos 1998). This can also be 
the case when parallel structures of rebel movements, and even violent movements like 
Hamas, maintain service provision for their followers. During its long independence war with 
Ethiopia, the Eritrean opposition developed a popular legitimacy and imagery both locally 
and internationally based on the health services it provided. Its small plastic sandal factory 
achieved iconic status and is now commemorated with a monument. An understanding of 
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these services can shed a different light on how they maintain and develop their legitimacy 
among their followers and the factors that determine their embeddedness in society. The 
everyday realities of war are not all-encompassing, and jumping to assumptions about war 
‘risks disabling precisely the strategies and tools of social organization, culture and politics 
through which violence can be reduced and its adverse effects mitigated’ (Richards 2005).
It is now beginning to be understood that the economies of war and of survival are deeply 
intertwined, and most activities are multi-faceted (Nordstrom 2004). The woman who 
brews beer for soldiers or barters products with rebels to make ends meet, for instance, also 
contributes to alcohol-related insecurity and the maintenance of violence. Interventions, 
however, often operate on the assumptions that economies are destroyed or have become 
a mere pretext to violence. This means that they aim to remove the economic drivers of 
conflict on the assumption that this is a precondition for rebuilding peace-time economic 
life, without considering what economic initiatives can be built on (Hilhorst 2007). The IS 
academy takes up the challenge of examining how the continuity and initiatives from below 
can become a part of resurrecting socio-economic life, as well as the role of institutions. 
Attribution of socio-economic problems in post-conflict or fragile states solely to the 
dynamics of conflict or fragility should be treated with caution. Many different factors 
come into play. Local economies in fragility or war are nonetheless tied into international 
economies, and are subject to the vagaries of climate and disaster, just to mention a few of 
these. Often there are underlying development problems that may predate the conflict (and 
may be among the root causes of conflict in the first place), or evolve relatively independent 
from the political situation. Current land problems in Burundi, for example, become 
manifest with the influx of returning refugees, yet are much more structurally caused by low 
productivity, land fragmentation and the lack of off-farm employment (van Leeuwen 2008).
The relation between development and security
The attention to socio-economic recovery in fragile states is partly driven by assumptions 
about the relation between development and security. It is assumed that socio-economic 
security has the potential to contribute to stability, which is expressed in the saying that there 
can be no peace without development and no development without peace. It is also assumed 
that development can enhance people’s confidence in durable peace (peace dividend) which 
entices them to return to their normal lives and resume investing in their futures. Further, it 
is assumed that development can contribute to restoration of the social fabric of society by 
revitalizing local institutions and trust. These assumptions are often driven by unwarranted 
faith in development narratives and lack empirical evidence. For instance, the recurring 
notion that the first 100 days after peace are crucial to enhance trust in the peace process, 
may lead to unwarranted and hasty development-oriented programming that may do harm in 
the long run. 
Empirically, we will approach these assumptions with an open mind. We expect that 
economic growth may indeed result in stability, but it may also contribute to instability, 
especially when it leads to increasing inequality and exclusion. We will keep an open mind 
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as to where economic security is derived from, and be cautious about attributing roles 
in recovery according to Western models. Socio-economic security can be derived from 
unexpected local institutions, including civil society structures, rather than from nationally-
driven state-centred initiatives. It is especially important for us to critically assess how macro-
economic strategies tie in with and condition economic strategies in specific localities.
Defining the nature of aid
In addition to the shifting labels for states, there have been a number of terms used to 
different forms of actions amid fragility which have provided conceptual and bureaucratic 
frameworks for aid response in contexts where conventional mechanisms and interagency 
relations have been shown to be unsuitable:
•	 Linking	relief,	rehabilitation	and	development	(LRRD)
 The desire to find ways to structure response to disasters preceded a concern for 
collapsed states. LRRD stems from a realisation, which emerged during the 1980s, 
that the cycle of recovery from disaster was not inevitable and, therefore, required 
special measures to ensure that the continuum leading back to development 
functioned as it should (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 2005). LRRD (and related 
terms, such as ‘developmental relief’) became an objective of many agencies. The 
early LRRD discourse reflected a need to proactively search for ways to ensure that, 
at a minimum, relief did not undermine the prospects for future development, and, 
hopefully, that it would greatly improve the prospects for a smooth transition back to 
normal development modalities. This conceptual framework increasingly came into 
disrepute by the late 1990s since it did not accommodate the chronic and recurrent 
nature of conflict and vulnerability to natural hazards. Furthermore, questions were 
raised about whether the categories of relief, rehabilitation and development referred 
more to structures of aid administration than to on-the-ground programming realities 
(White and Cliffe 2000). This critique stressed that the complex factors that led to 
emergencies could not be fixed with more cleverly designed relief projects. It is indeed 
partially a reaction to simplistic and above all over-optimistic assumptions associated 
with LRRD, that properly planned relief would be likely to contribute to a linear process 
leading toward normal development, which inspired the alternative labels listed above. 
LRRD is not dead today, despite the criticisms made. Continuum thinking repeatedly 
slides back into recovery modalities despite glaring evidence that it is not happening 
according to plan (Koddenbrock 2009). This is presumably because the need to show 
progress in the new security agenda demands results (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 
2005), even if prevailing knowledge about fragile states suggests that these results are 
likely to be ephemeral.
•	 Responding	to	complex	political	emergencies/protracted	crises
 The main reaction to LRRD in the mid-1990s was the introduction of new label of 
‘complex political emergencies’ which was driven by a desire to find a fundamentally 
different approach to politically complex conflicts. This discourse sought to distance 
humanitarian response to conflict from that of ‘natural disasters’, which were 
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at the time said to be the inspiration for inappropriate LRRD approaches. The 
conflicts in Somalia, Afghanistan, the Great Lakes, the Western Balkans and East 
Timor focused attention on complex political emergencies and the need for models 
that acknowledged the need for aid amidst chronic conflict and protracted crisis 
(White and Cliffe 2000; Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 2005). The World Bank has 
acknowledged the need for ‘differentiated approaches’ in fragile states, with scenarios 
of deterioration, prolonged crisis or impasse, post-conflict or political transition, or 
gradual improvement (Operations Policy and Country Services 2005). One downside 
of the modalities that emerged related to complex political emergencies was that 
it left (and to a major extent still leaves) response to disasters triggered by natural 
hazards in fragile states in a conceptual and operational limbo (Christoplos 2000; 
Buchanan-Smith and Christoplos 2004). The extremely weak links between conflict and 
‘natural disaster’ recovery efforts in Aceh and Sri Lanka after the South Asian tsunami 
(Christoplos 2006) are evidence that this remains unaddressed despite increasing 
attention being given to the need for modalities to deal with the inter-relationships 
between increasing natural hazards due to climate change and insecurity in the fragile 
states that are confronted with these hazards (Young, et al, 2009). 
•	 Transitional	programming
 Partially inspired by the need for a paradigm to address the fundamental reform 
processes in ex-Marxist states, starting in the early 1990s a variety of initiatives were 
labelled as transitional. Currently the transition label generally refers to post conflict 
response rather than post-Marxist reform. The label retains the linear assumptions of 
LRRD, but acknowledges that ‘transition’ is a different condition than either collapse 
or normal development, and thus requires different modalities focused more on 
institutions and state building. 
•	 Early	recovery
 The introduction of the cluster approach to humanitarian action was seen to require a 
‘new’ aid category, which has been labelled ‘early recovery.’ The meaning of this term 
is still being defined, but it appears to encompass a highly ambitious combination of 
objectives and tools for initial rehabilitation investment and state-building directed 
primarily toward provision of basic services. It is ‘guided by development principles’ 
(UNDP 2008) but includes little guidance regarding how to relate to the nature of 
fragile states. It suggests that an ‘early recovery network’, be establish and led ‘as far as 
possible, depending on the context’ by the government. It is thus far unclear how early 
recovery will avoid reintroducing the distortions of the earlier discourse on LRRD. One 
of the problems seems to be that the organization of aid enhances the treatment of 
early recovery as a separate sector rather than a cross-cutting concern that ties in with 
preceding and succeeding processes.
•	 Good	enough	governance
 While generally not explicitly linked to the discourse on fragile states, there has been a 
recognition in development circles that conventional guidelines for good governance 
are not realistic for many more or less fragile states where objectives and strategies 
must be tempered by an understanding of what may be possible at different times 
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and what prevailing ‘drivers of change’ exist in a given context (DFID 2005). Grindle 
(2005) has proposed an alternative objective of striving for ‘good enough governance’. 
This concept has the potential of providing a basis for pragmatically determining how 
to sequence and encourage development in situations where conventional checklists 
of what elements of governance ‘must be in place’ are obvious inapplicable. The 
Netherlands has likewise moved away from applying criteria of good governance as 
thresholds for aid and instead adopts a notion that development assistance should 
not be risk-averse and must retain a flexible approach to governance criteria in order to 
allow interventions to find their way in fragile situations.
•	 Rule	of	Law
 International policy in fragile states or post-conflict societies has been criticised 
for being too normative and too much oriented towards the formal restoration of 
democracy. In response, policies are now increasingly geared to (re-) establish the rule 
of law. Rule of Law approaches aim to ensure that institutions necessary to uphold the 
law (such as police and judiciary) operate properly, but leave more room for national 
ownership as they do not aim to dictate the content of the laws to be upheld. Rule of 
Law approaches have a number of advantages compared to state building models, 
in particular because they take a comprehensive view of (some) institutions and are 
oriented towards the security needs of people. They also have disadvantages in seeking 
to establish particular institutional frameworks while overlooking how security needs 
are perhaps already being met through the multiple or informal arrangements that 
have evolved over time. They also tend to over-emphasise state solutions and ignore 
the equally important protective practices of non-state actors.
Chronologically, this jumble of models can be loosely described as being reflective of a series 
of gradual shifts. Earlier assumptions of the possibility to use aid to drive a more or less 
linear continuum from fragility/conflict/collapse to ‘normal’ development have been replaced 
by an acknowledgement that contiguums (Buchanan-Smith & Fabbri 2005) exist, wherein a 
number of processes and aid forms must exist simultaneously, and that these contiguums 
may prevail during an indefinite period of time. This shift concerns both socio-economic 
processes as state or institution building approaches. These shifts, however, have not yet 
resulted in substantial changes in the practices of aid. While we know much better what 
aid should not aim to achieve, it is not sufficiently clear what should drive aid instead of the 
‘return to normalcy’ of the LRRD continuum. As a result, we witness the repeated tendency 
to either apply labels and programming modalities that slide back to continuum approaches 
(Koddenbrock 2009), or to apply labels that can be interpreted as sidestepping the bigger 
picture, such as ‘early recovery’. One of the present contradiction is that the ambitions for aid 
have become less robust in abandoning notions of linear development, but at the same time 
we see that the ambitions of aid stretch farther than ever, in seeking increasingly complicated 
levels of integration and the piling up of objectives, including (a) the development task of 
state building, (b) the humanitarian imperative of ensuring service provision and (c) the 
international demand to preserve security. 
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Box	2.	Coping	and	development	interventions	for	economic	and	food	security
                                                                                                                                                 
Humanitarian and development agencies use similar terminology for different 
approaches to achieve what are inherently different rehabilitation and development 
goals that reflect different levels of ambition. At one end of the spectrum are efforts 
that are primarily oriented toward shoring up existing or past coping and survival 
strategies. At the other ends are programmes directed toward addressing the 
underlying factors that create poverty and foster violence. The following table presents 
a somewhat stylised set of brief descriptions of examples of programming at either end 
of the coping-development continuum.
Coping	and	early	recovery Development and sustainability
Providing cash grants for daily  
survival and reinvestment in small 
enterprise
Promoting social protection measures that 
can be managed by the state and targeted 
toward the chronic poor
Increased access to low-interest  
credit via a range of NGOs and  
small organisations
Support to larger, potentially sustainable 
microfinance institutions with professional, 
specialised staff and which charge interest 
rates that can lead to future viability
Distribution of imported seeds and 
contracting of state institutes to multiply 
seeds for free and  
widespread distribution
Investments in seed systems, including a 
defined role for the state in ensuring quality 
control and support to market oriented 
seedproduction enterprises
‘Renting’ local agricultural advisory  
organisations to provide agricultural 
extension services to chosen groups of 
‘beneficiaries’
Long-term investments in extension systems 
with links to value chain actors and research 
in country and in the region
Business development services and 
capital investment focused on a small 
number of ‘winners’ who can be 
expected to re-establish their businesses 
quickly and (perhaps) eventually 
contribute to broader economic 
dynamism 
Private sector development programmes 
which include analysis and close monitoring 
of both broader market trends and potential 
pro-poor impacts through strengthening of 
labour markets and links to public and private 
institutions
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The models and principles of aid have received ample attention, yet this needs to be 
matched with research into the way aid models and programming actually works in 
society. Important questions are how aid fits into people’s lifeworlds, strategies and 
livelihoods, how aid programmes shift the power balances in society and may have 
many unintended effects, and how they are anchored in ongoing socio-economic and 
institutional processes.
                                                                                                                                                 
Fragile	state	discourses	and	the	IS	academy
From the above, we derive four main conclusions that guide the IS academy:
1.  The label of ‘fragile states’ hides a large variation in conditions. Processes occur 
in fragile societies which result in a certain level of market functionality and socio-
economic organisation that may or may not be triggered by aid interventions (and 
when they are this often concerns unintended effects). We call these local ordering 
processes. The notions of chaos that permeated early analyses of collapsed states 
are being replaced with recognition that recovery is about dealing with existing local 
ordering processes and not about filling a vacuum. The role of local and nationally 
driven processes is increasingly considered important, but remains ambiguous. There 
is a growing recognition that fragility is a national issue and not just a challenge for the 
international community, but there is less consensus about what that means for aid 
modalities and levels of ambition. This is mainly due to a lack of empirical insights into 
what drives local institutional and socio-economic processes.
2.  The debates on fragile states have stimulated a rethink about the merging of 
humanitarian, development and security agendas in those spaces. Past debates 
over which principles should frame policies and programming, are being overtaken 
by a growing realisation that there is, instead, a need to identify where the potential 
dangers and synergies of this merging are greatest, and to identify strategies to more 
pragmatically protect and promote these principles accordingly (Grindle 2005). This 
marks a shift in attention from the principles of aid to process approaches. It also 
shifts attention from models of aid to the empirical realities of aid in practice.
3.  The overwhelming attention to peace-building and state-building agendas has led 
to a neglect of what may be the ultimate determinant of whether the social compact 
between state and citizen exists, i.e., if a minimal level of food and economic security 
are being maintained. In contexts of chronic conflict and uncertainty, populations are 
often accustomed to relatively ephemeral state structures. Expectations for provision 
of basic services are scaled down and attention shifts to non-state, market-driven 
actors, at least for those who can afford these services. Protection of human life and 
safety becomes a responsibility of the international community. Securing people’s 
entitlements, access to productive assets and markets is a major component of 
recovery and one of our working hypotheses is that this may largely determine the 
legitimacy of authorities in the eyes of local people.
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4.  A main lesson of the discourse on fragile states over the past two decades for the IS 
Academy is that the design (and critique) of alternative models and principles is not 
necessarily the most useful starting point if the label ‘fragile states’ is to open a field 
of critical inquiry. The models developed have provided a way of understanding how 
fragile states differ from non-fragile states, but have failed to give guidance on what to 
do about them. An alternative is to focus on the interfaces and national and local levels 
where policies and practice meet. The Academy hence aims to study processes at the 
interfaces of socio-economic recovery, institutional conditions and cultures, and the 
socio-political dynamics of interventions. 
With regard to institutions, the academy takes an empirical focus that steps away from the 
more normative approaches of nation-building, good governance and rule of law models. 
Instead, the approach proposed in the next chapter focuses on capacities. A focus on 
institutional and personal capacities is open-minded in getting to grips with what exists 
rather than what ought to exist, while retaining the possibility of providing entry points for 
interventions and programming.
The Academy follows a shift over the past decade to a focus on livelihoods (see chapter 5). It 
has been recognised that the cornerstone of survival amid protracted crisis is not and should 
not be food aid or a faith that the markets for food and labour will sort themselves out in a 
humane manner. The confusion of labels, templates and concepts outlined above illustrates 
an acknowledgement that livelihoods exist in fragile states, with or without aid. Some are 
sustainable, some not, some are legitimate, some not, some provide a minimum of food 
security, some not, some are reliant on formal, state and market institutions, some thrive on 
their absence. The IS Academy will analyse the implications of people’s livelihood struggles 
within the broader conditions for economic and food security in fragile states. The research 
of the IS Academy will call attention to the interplay of intervention mechanisms and local 
organisation of livelihoods in order to develop more empirically grounded understanding of 
how livelihood struggles relate to the political economies of aid, markets and state formation 
in fragile states. 
The academy will seek out when and how interventions become meaningful to enhance 
people’s security, for instance through asset provision, support to coping strategies, 




supportive institutions and creating an enabling environment and the rule of law. This 
starts with a focus on the working of interventions in practice. Understanding the role of 
interventions starts with recognising the dynamics of how different groups of actors have 
a role in livelihood processes: political structures, public sector, private sector, informal 
community institutions, civil society actors including religious actors, households and aid 
agencies. Competing claims on entitlements to resources and power always play a role. Aid 
interventions can be seen as spaces where these different actors manoeuvre to realize their 
own projects, and are anchored in these political, economic and socio-cultural processes. 




Fragile states and fragile capacities
Why start with capacities?
The issue of capacity has not been a major theme in discussions of aid response in fragile 
states. The problems described above regarding labelling are a reflection of tendencies to 
implicitly assume that there are virtually no capacities in fragile states. This produces the 
assumption that the building blocks of state building and recovery are in the hands of the 
international community: there is a crisis, thus, there is a blank slate. This is where much 
of the discourse goes astray. In the most fragile of states there are functioning institutions, 
organisations and people, all with significant capacities. There are multiple rules and norms 
that govern the actions of the state and the private sector, even if there are also usually 
considerable opportunities to circumvent these norms. One of the stratifying mechanisms 
in such conditions becomes the ways in which different actors manage to exploit their room 
for manoeuvre to circumvent, bend or cross between different sets of rules to enhance their 
own projects. The interfaces between policies and practice are where people are engaged in 
developing their own institutional, organisational and human resource capacities. The failure 
to recognise and respect these strategies frequently causes aid efforts to go astray. A capacity 
focus can overcome this by better recognising how actors are, themselves, developing their 
own opportunities and (re)creating organisations and institutions amid the most fragile of 
state structures. 
There are, however, also examples of where a romanticised view of local (usually civil) society 
obscures understanding of the dynamics of change and the often uncivil nature of the 
societies in question. For example development programming enabled civil society actors in 
Rwanda to assume a role in the genocide of 2004 (Uvin 1998). Furthermore, it would also 
be a mistake to disregard people’s vulnerabilities. The HIV/ AIDS pandemic, for example, 
has severely effected people’s capacities to recover (Waal 2002). Recognition and respect 
for local capacities should not lead to uncritical assumptions about what these capacities 
amount to and to what ends they are being applied .
Although we find capacities to be a good analytical entry-point for our discussion, two 
disclaimers are required. First, the term capacities is used here in an open-minded way. It 
does not imbue these capacities with the expectations embodied in the development agenda 
of ‘capacity building.’ This aid discourse on ‘capacity building’ is often misguided from a 
local perspective and overlooks the political and other entanglements of capacities within 
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broader institutional constellations. Secondly, we recognize that questions of capacities are 
contested and interrelate with questions of both legitimacy and the often contested nature of 
the state in these settings. Formal state power is often elitist and contested by local claims 
for autonomy. The capacity to resolve such contestations in non-violent ways could be the 
major hallmark of a ‘de-fragilzed state (de Waal 2009). 
Institutional	capacities:	the	(seemingly)	most	obvious	breakdowns
Narrow preconceptions of what institutions exist in fragile states derive from simple checklist 
approaches to capacity development. The reality is one of existence of multiple normative 
frameworks in the flux of change rather than absence of institutions. When states are not 
capable of imposing norms, this does not represent a vacuum, it is an opening where a 
range of norms can exist simultaneously. Hesselbein et al (2006) suggest that recognition of 
‘institutional multiplicity’ can provide an entry point for awareness of the four ‘rule systems’ 






These categories can help to transcend the legalistic tunnel vision that can constrain analyses 
and initiatives in fragile states. They can also overcome the formalistic categorisation 
of formal and informal institutions which is the starting point for many conventional 
institutional approaches, but sheds little light on the dynamics of fragile states, where even 
formal institutions are managed in highly informal ways.  
Box 3. What do we mean when we refer to institutions?
                                                                                                                                                 
Institutions are structures and practices that govern people’s behaviour and 
interactions. They can be highly formalised and established (in law or organizations 
for example) but usually have an emergent character. They evolve and change in tacit 
ways, and hence their level of institutionalization varies. Institutions are shaped in the 
interaction between structures and practices. Because social actors invoke, negotiate 
and manipulate the meaning of institutions in their everyday life, institutional change 
happens all the time. Hence, institutions provide ordering, but there is never order. 
Systems of meaning never attain coherence and closure.
Institutions can have different sources of legitimacy, such as state endorsed, socially 
legitimized by tradition, introduced by exogeneous development, or forwarded by 
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contestants to state power. This means that there are usually alternative institutions 
governing entitlements, systems of authority and representation, mechanisms 
for dispute resolution, organization of local level security, and the organization of 
economic transactions. This may lead to conflict, yet it is also in this multiplicity 
of institutions that people find room for manoeuvre to negotiate institutional 
arrangements. 
Fragile states are characterized by more fluid and rapidly changing 
institutions, because of a combination of responses to lack of legitimate 
state institutions, rivalry between different sources of power and legitimacy 
and emerging new problems and changing conditions as a result of violence 
and displacement. The contestation of institutions in these situations is 
not limited to the problematic of states, but may equally concern changing 
traditional institutions, such as chieftaincy and patronage, or newly 
introduced developmental arrangements. It is important to document these 
multiple processes and understand their effects on local ordering processes, 
the governance of entitlements and processes of in- and exclusion.
                                                                                                                                                 
The following very briefly presents examples of the main overlapping areas of institutional 
dysfunction that tend to appear in fragile states:
•	 Social	institutions
 Social capital is a catch-all term for the norms and customs that enable people to 
come together to deal with problems, to develop the trust required for economic 
development and even to address the short-comings of the state. The search for 
solutions for fragile states has at times led to over-optimistic assumptions that 
pre-existing social institutions can fill the gap. Empirical research has consistently 
shown that social capital continues to exist in fragile states, but it may also have been 
weakened by many of the factors that have affected the state. It is not a grand solution 
and neither is it usually very equitable. Nonetheless, existing social structures may 
be the strongest basis for normative change in a fragile state and therefore must be a 
central point of departure for understanding and addressing human security (Manor, 
2006).
•	 Political	institutions
 Politics does not disappear in a conflict zone, but the norms that channel political 
action toward constructive aims are weakened, along with the sanctions that may 
otherwise exist against predatory and populist political behaviour. Political institutions 
are more easily used for personal and short-term gain. This can lead to plunder 
of natural resources or attempts to transfer access to economic assets to political 
supporters. These tendencies are far from unique to fragile states, but the extent to 
which coercive power is unfettered is greater. This frequently creates contradictions 
in aid to fragile states. Promotion of a rapid transition to democracy or at least a 
modicum of political legitimacy and phasing out of international administration 
(i.e., Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina, etc.), are run simultaneous to field level 
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programmes, particularly those that are labelled as humanitarian, that struggle to keep 
local politicians from ‘politicising’ the aid effort. 
•	 Natural	resource	management	institutions
 Traditional norms for managing natural resources are in many contexts more 
important than formal rules. These traditional structures may or may not be affected 
by conflicts and a weakening of the regulatory capacity of the state. A collapse of 
land-use planning and regulation may increase the likelihood of disasters stemming 
from natural hazards (especially in earthquake prone countries such as Afghanistan) 
and make coordinated and large scale climate change adaptation actions impossible. 
But these formal capacities tend to be very limited in even modestly weak states as 
well, raising questions about whether it is realistic to expect these institutions to be a 
priority in fragile states. Conflict may shield predatory extraction of lumber and other 
resources, or it may protect some areas as foreign investment is discouraged due to 
insecurity and even landmines. There is a significant debate about the extent to which 
institutional failures in governance over natural resources (perhaps being intensified by 
climate change) is a primary driver behind state fragility (Samset 2009).
•	 Economic	and	financial	institutions
 Functioning markets rely on formal and informal regulatory structures, monitoring 
functions and ethical norms. These may be absent or severely weakened, thereby 
undermining the trust that must underpin economic development. Formal banking 
systems may collapse, but informal financial services, such as the hawala system 
operating in Afghanistan, Somalia and other fragile states may quite efficiently replace 
many of the services provided by formal institutions in other countries, especially 
in providing channels for transfer of remittances. It is starting to be recognised that 
addressing gaps in economic and financial institutions in fragile states requires a long-
term process toward the development of formal institutions at the same time as taking 
an ‘if it isn’t broke, don’t fix it’ approach to informal structures. The problem with such 
a two-track approach is that there is significant suspicion, sometime justified, that 
informal structures are being used for illicit political and economic activities which may 
also undermine equity and justice. 
•	 Judicial,	tax	and	regulatory	institutions
 There are some areas where informal institutions are wholly inadequate for meeting 
human security needs. Formal incentives and sanctions guiding the behaviour of 
politicians, civil servants, the private sector and civil society tend to be weak or absent 
in fragile states, with implications for food and economic security. This can have 
direct impact on, for example, whether an international or national aid provider can 
be held accountable for their work, or if farmers can trust that the fertilisers that they 
buy contain the ingredients that are on the label. Lack of capacity for taxation means 
that governmental resources are so limited as to create undue reliance on aid for core 




 Many of the above symptoms of fragility lead to a severe deficit of transparency, 
leading in turn to corruption and a lack of trust in political, market and judicial 
institutions. Lack of functioning judicial authority means that corruption in the use of 
aid cannot be effectively constrained apart from using the rather blunt power of purse 
strings. Sometimes corruption is so endemic that it is taken for granted. This can 
become one of the most fundamental obstacles to rebuilding respect, accountability 
and a leadership role for the state and can lead to chronic fragility.
Even if these institutions are deemed to be exceedingly weak, merely pointing out failure 
can be counterproductive. Documenting fragility can encourage humanitarian agencies to 
‘fill the gap’ with structures that do little to address the underlying institutional factors that 
constrain economic and food security. For example, agencies promoting so-called livelihood 
programmes frequently help small scale farmers from a limited geographical area to sell 
their goods in international markets. These projects tend to bypass the weak or non-existent 
institutional structures that would be needed in order to secure access to these markets after 
the close of the project. Phyto-sanitary regulatory structures, market information systems 
and trusted financial intermediaries are part of any market chains. In fragile states these may 
be more informal than in other countries, but they must exist. Somalia has, with significant 
yet uneven success, retained access to livestock markets. Informal financial markets linking 
Afghanistan to international markets have existed throughout the conflict. Research into 
seed systems has in most cases shown that the informal institutional structures through 
which farmers accessed seeds before the onset of ‘fragility’ still function, and that seeds 
and tools programmes frequently yield little additional benefit. Local people may know quite 
well how to protect their communities from floods and landslides, but the current popularity 
of disaster risk reduction among humanitarian agencies may lead to training courses that 
provide little added value. Agencies frequently ignore these institutional realities because of 
their ignorance and the pressure to demonstrate legitimacy for both internal and external 
audiences encourages them to overstate their own importance.
This is not to suggest that vulnerable populations in fragile states can necessarily rely on 
existing institutions. The lack of formal institutions to defend property rights can create 
openings for land-grabbing and theft of other resources such as water and forest. This 
may occur on local scales, when warlords and other powerful local authorities expropriate 
resources, or on a global scale, as evidenced by the Daewoo Corporation’s recent leasing 
of half the arable land in Madagascar and Chinese investments in a number of countries. 
These kinds of resource grabs frequently occur in rural hinterlands where states that would 
otherwise not generally be characterised as ‘fragile’ are unable to exert legitimate authority, or 
where isolation from public attention and weak rule of law create incentives for extortion by 
either national or local officials. All of these points contribute to weakening the legitimacy of 
the state. If the state cannot facilitate or regulate, it cannot be said to govern. The challenges 
highlighted above point to the Janus face of private sector development amid weakened 
institutions. A vibrant private sector is a far more effective generator of economic and 
food security than a collection of ‘livelihood projects’, but such vibrancy can also be highly 







Effective inspection and 
certification of agricultural 
inputs
Tariffs on grain imports from 
countries with subsidies
Access to research and 
extension services
Investment in infrastructure
Investments in value chains 
to enable local producers 
to access national and 
international markets
Closely managed food aid 
programmes that do not 
compete with local markets 
for food or (in the case 
of food for work) labour 
at critical times in the 
agricultural cycle
Uncontrolled borders leading 
to imports of dangerous and/
or ineffective agrichemicals and 
subsidised agricultural products 
Corruption and chaotic regulatory 
and tax structures leading to 
uncertainty about a ‘level playing 
field’ in markets
Lack of access to new varieties 
and breeds and knowledge of how 
to produce them
Lack of knowledge about markets
Isolation from domestic and 




Phytosanitary control to 
meet export requirements 
and to prevent imports that 
introduce disease and pests
Security -particularly 
important with livestock 
due to isolated pastures and 
relative ease of transporting 
and sale of stolen animals
Lack of capacity to meet export 
requirements
Lack of control over imports, 
impacting on disease vectors, 
biodiversity, etc.
Insecurity and theft









Sustainable management of 
common property resources 
based on social capital and 
maintenance of traditional 
norms
Protection of forests, 
watersheds and biodiversity
Land-use planning (formal 
or informal) to mitigate risks 
of flooding, landslides, etc.
Uncontrolled and unregulated 
extractive industries
War economies resulting in 
a breakdown of reciprocal 
patron-client ties, replaced 
with unsustainable extractive 
exploitation of natural resource 
base, especially common property
Land grabbing of fallow lands 
leading to collapse of swidden 
production systems and over-




Climate for investment by a range 
of market actors creating jobs 
throughout value chains
Capital availability and security 
for investments in a range of rural 
enterprises
Mobility (security, appropriate 
laws) to allow landless populations 
to seek employment where wages 
are highest
Powerful (armed) actors control access to 
local populations, pushing down wages
Insecurity and uncertainty prevents 
investment, pushing rural economy 
toward household subsistence 
production
Industry (Re)investment in medium and 
large-scale industry generally 
reliant on strong institutional 
environment
Small-scale construction industry 
usually benefits significantly from 
recovery investments (especially 
housing) and return of private 
capital for other small and 
medium-scale businesses
Lack of large-scale capital for local 
entrepreneurs to take advantage of 
investment opportunities, e.g., leading to 
reconstruction contracts being awarded 
to firms from non-fragile states
Lack of human resources with 
appropriate skills and lack of functioning 
national structures for training
Insecurity and uncertainty regarding tax 
and regulatory structures discourages 
investment
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Young, et al (2009) report that in Darfur the state actively encourages ‘asset stripping’ both 
for commercial gain and to deprive their political opponents access to livelihoods. This leads 
to a vicious cycle as asset-stripping resulting from conflict-related processes, policies, and 
institutions weakens pre-existing survival strategies informal institutions. People’s livelihood 
adaptations due to their loss of assets lead to further conflict. Young, et al cite examples 
such as ‘grazing by nomads of farmers’ fields, the fencing-off of common grazing land for 
cultivation purposes, the gender-based violence used to control access to forestry resources, 
and the blocking of nomadic access to traditional rainy season grazing lands.’ 
Organisational capacities
The most obvious elements of state strength and fragility is whether the organs of 
governance function, whether a modicum of basic public services are being provided and 
(increasingly) whether the international community has a functioning ‘partner’ to align with. 
The latter has to do with ability to channel aid within national budgets with an acceptable 
level of transparency and capacity to participate as a ‘partner’ in planning or even to lead 
policy discussions. These capacities can exist in either governmental structures or in private 
service providers or civil society. In fragile states aid is more often than not channelled 
through non-state actors on the assumption that they are either stronger or can scale up 
their capacities in a fast and flexible manner. Some donors and NGOs choose specific types 
of partners for ideological reasons, related to their own views about appropriate future roles 
for the state, civil society and the private sector. Organisational development is generally 
portrayed as a relatively technical process, but particularly in fragile states the choice of 
target organisations and the visions for their future roles can have significant ideological 
undertones.
There are vast gaps between the humanitarian and developmental agendas with respect to 
strategic and tactical objectives in organisational development. The missing links between 
relief, rehabilitation and development can become most apparent when it comes to what 
is expected and what is supported in organisations. The Sphere standards, for example, 
have set goals for service provision that are far beyond the capacities of most fragile states. 
This gap may even be growing. Human rights based approaches that demand certain levels 
of service provision as a ‘right’ and calls for greater accountability among humanitarian 
agencies have steadily raised expectations regarding benchmarks for NGO service provision. 
At the same time, development thinking has begun to acknowledge that objectives should 
focus more on ‘good enough governance’, which reflects the human resources, financial 
flows and institutional environments that characterise fragile states. More attention is being 
paid to sequencing organisational development ambitions than in setting short-term service 
provision targets. The humanitarian imperative may come first in humanitarian operations1, 
but sustainability is given higher priority in development efforts which may suggest very 
different priorities.
1  The Red Cross and Red Crescent Code of Conduct for humanitarian action begins with the statement that 
‘The humanitarian imperative comes first’.
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The interface between these contrasting sets of expectations is a possible area for IS 
Academy research in that it highlights the challenges of choosing between different ways to 
balance slower and uncertain state building approaches with the need to get services running 
for a significant proportion of the population. The emerging ‘early recovery’ agenda reflects 
a perceived need to move from the patchy nature of service provision that exists in most 
fragile states to national systems. But there are as yet few answers about how this scaling-
up can be achieved given expected trajectories for the development of capacities in public 
service providers. One aspect that comes in is the problem of scale: the pockets of service 
delivery versus a planned approach that builds up from primary to secondary to tertiary levels 
(education, health) and aims to provide citizens with similar service levels. For example, in 
Angola state water services are almost free but coverage is so limited that most people are 
dependent on private water sources which often consume 10 % - 30% of available income in 
poor urban areas. 
In development efforts, particularly those promoted by the US, fragility is often portrayed 
as an ‘opportunity’ to introduce new public management, i.e., new structures of slimmer 
government with services either contracted out to the private sector or left for the market 
to provide (Christoplos 2000). The most compelling argument for taking advantage of this 
‘opportunity’ is that conflicts whittle down civil service agencies and severely restrict tax 
revenues, which is interpreted as suggesting that there is no need to build up what was 
there before if there is no realistic hope of maintaining a strong public bureaucracy for the 
foreseeable future. 
Although the basic logic of not recreating an inefficient bureaucracy and looking for new 
efficient approaches cannot be denied, this does create a conundrum. In post-conflict and 
post-disaster contexts the demand for public services is extremely high. Ability to provide 
these services is perceived by the public as evidence of whether or not the state is back in 
operation. Expectations often reflect hope for a return of the paternalistic state that existed in 
the past. The public is unlikely to accept a different role for the state if the alternative, leaner 
version of governance does not get off the ground. A ‘market’ for the services in question 
cannot be created overnight; there are very few service providers apart from NGOs that are 
ideologically and structurally oriented toward free (aid financed) service provision. There is 
also little or no capacity within government structures to be the ‘smart buyer’ of services 
that new public management demands. This is an area where more research is needed into 
the interface between policies and the organisations that are tasked with implementing 
such reforms, be they government agencies that are expected to be transformed into service 
procurers or NGOs that are pressured to become vehicles for commercialised public service 
contractors. 
Fragility is also often seen to be an ‘opportunity’ to decentralise functions from central 
government to local authorities. Central ministries are rightly seen as being busy enough 
getting their own houses in order. They usually have little capacity (or motivation) to get 
out of the capital city. Local authorities are often taking advantage of the power vacuum by 
strengthening their own role in governance and control. Given that decentralisation is by 
nature seen as being generally a ‘good thing’ in most development circles, it is natural that 
advice frequently leans toward ‘going with the flow’ by formalising de facto trends toward 
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decentralisation. Problems arise in that, whereas local authorities may be gathering more 
power, that does not necessarily carry with it capacities to provide a modicum of governance, 
much less withstand the temptations presented by commercial investors. The result is that, 
instead of developing a social contract with the local population (which is a core underlying 
assumption about the value of decentralisation), these authorities frequently become 
involved in selling natural resources, managing illicit enterprises and even extorting land 
and forced labour from their ‘constituents’. Even where their intentions are appropriate 
and financing is available, local authorities may lack the knowledge or staff to implement 
measures to reduce risks of future conflicts or adapt to climate change. Experience with 
natural disaster risk mapping has shown that local authorities and communities can easily 
be mobilised for planning but that implementation is a much harder task (Christoplos et al 
2009 forthcoming). Decentralisation is another interface between policy and practice that 
deserves closer analysis. 
The nitty gritty challenges of rebuilding a state (service provision in particular) are commonly, 
and in some respects accurately, seen as related to the capacities of the individuals working 
with public, private and civil society organisations. This is not to say that it should be seen 
as simple or straightforward. An understanding of the context of human resource capacities 
requires a transnational perspective. Conflicts create brain drains that can continue long 
after the cessation of hostilities. This has rightly been acknowledged as having potentially 
very positive impacts on human resources when returnees from the Diaspora are engaged 
in recovery efforts, but can result in considerable tensions as well. The skills and experience 
of returning former refugees are an important resource for fragile states, but this resource 
can be difficult to situate in recovery of private or public institutions. Many returnees have 
primarily worked in factories but have little opportunity to apply their skills upon return to 
obtain economic security for their families or contribute to broader economic development 
given the absence of a functioning industrial sector in most post-conflict contexts. Even 
where there is progress toward re-industrialisation, the new industry may bear little 
resemblance to the labour intensive industry of the past (e.g., Bosnia Herzegovina, see 
Christoplos 2007b). Rural development, through agriculture or other forms of investment 
linked to natural resource management, may be where the greatest potential exists, but few 
refugees have worked in rural areas during their absence and those that have were most likely 
engaged as hired labour on large farms, providing little relevant experience for finding food 
security. 
There are links between the fragility of governmental agencies in retaining qualified staff 
and the relative strength of civil society and the private sector. ‘Poaching’ of government 
staff by international agencies, local NGOs and the private sector is common. This may 
involve providing payment levels far in excess of government salary scales. It may also 
involve provision of salary top-ups and other incentives for government staff to apply their 
full attention to a given donor funded project rather than following their job description or 
responding to the needs of their agency. This is one of the issues that the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness has been meant to address. The weak penetration of the Paris Agenda in 
fragile states is evident, though by this measure there are similar problems in countries that 
have made strong ostensive endorsements of the Paris Agenda and which are not generally 
perceived to be ‘fragile’.
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The boom-bust world of aid in fragile states is not conducive to conventional assumptions 
and processes of ‘capacity building’. People have their capacities built and then move 
on to organisations where they can best use their new skills and where they are offered 
better conditions. This does not mean that capacity development is impossible, but 
rather that investments often contribute to strengthening the human resource pool rather 
than contributing to a steady development of the specific organisation being supported. 
‘Poaching’ of highly qualified staff does damage Southern/Eastern institutions, but it would 
seem that these individuals should have the same rights as their Northern colleagues to 
develop their careers as they choose. The experience and skills that they develop after they 
have been ‘poached’ will in most cases be fed back into local organisations after large 
operations are phased out.
The dichotomies of relief and development are apparent in the ‘capacity building’ efforts 
applied fragile states. The humanitarian sector leans heavily toward quick fixes for the human 
resource aspects of capacity, primarily investing in training to address the international 
agencies’ own instrumental objectives. 
When is a state no longer ‘fragile’?
Reducing or dealing with fragility depends on processes of change in the institutional, 
organisational and human resource capacities of states, civil society, businesses and the 
household. The fragility concept can be (re)defined as a question of who can do what. 
Fragility can be measured in terms of whether or not households and businesses are able 
to achieve their most basic aims; whether or not states can carry out their most basic 
responsibilities; and how these processes interact.
Any exploration of capacities related to economic and food security leads to grey zones 
between the roles of the state, private sector, civil societies. There are a range of ideological 
positions regarding who should do what. These positions can undermine recovery if they are 
not informed by awareness of who wants to do what and who has the capacity to do what. 
The fragmented perspective of the aid community can obscure the interfaces where these 
different capacities need to fit together to form functioning societies and economies that 
result in a modicum of human security. It is in the interfaces of how these pieces fit together 
that the IS Academy may be able to provide greatest insight. Analysis of the processes of 
change in how capacities are developed, degraded and distorted can provide a framework for 
the IS Academy to concretise the academic discourse within the immediate capacity-related 




Socio-economic security in fragile 
states
Defining the research area 
The previous chapters have summarised the context of the IS Academy research with regard 
to the concepts that underpin interventions in fragile states and the underlying nature of 
fragility in terms of capacities. This chapter will present the basic assumptions about socio-
economic security that will structure the research itself. 
The IS Academy focuses on the interlinkages between socio-economic security (including 
food security, livelihood resilience, income generating capacities, social protection) and the 
development of political and institutional structures. One of the concerns is to examine 
complex and conflict-ridden interactions between processes of economic transformation, 
especially with regard to the non-state actors that dominate the realm of socio-economic 
recovery, and the political transformations underway in specific regions. This includes a 
conundrum in that the focus is on the role of the state and related political process within the 
(largely) private spheres of how households act to maintain food and economic security. The 
research programme needs to be cognisant of the strong ideological stances on the relative 
roles of public and private, while retaining an empirical focus on what evidence reveals about 
how states foster or inhibit enabling environments for more robust livelihood strategies. 
This also means that the research needs to be reflexive about presuppositions regarding the 
desired roles of states, civil societies and private actors that slip into the research questions 
and designs. To this purpose, we will critically interrogate each other’s work and seek external 
reviews on the reports and publications we write. 
The research shall map the roles of the state in its interactions with civil society and the 
private sector in promoting equitable recovery and development and/or how the nature of 
these interactions contribute to increasing clientelism and social/political/ cultural exclusion 
in socio-economic structures. A central question is the likelihood that fragile states and other 
stakeholders in fragile countries will act in an inclusive manner, or if they are inevitably drawn 
into processes that are intrinsically linked to trajectories of exclusion. The need to achieve an 
understanding of the intertwined nature of trends toward inclusion and exclusion is a central 
focus of the IS Academy. 
The research focuses on the interfaces between people’s livelihoods, institutions and 
interventions. Interface analysis focuses on the linkages and networks between individuals 
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or parties at points where different and often conflicting life-worlds or social fields intersect 
(Long 1989). Interface analysis can help uncover important dynamics concerning the 
interplay of discourses, the way in which power relations get shaped and actors give meaning 
to and transform development processes and aid interventions. It contributes to our 
understanding of how institutions and actors frame each other and how aid as an external 
factor becomes ‘internalised’ and comes to form part of the constraints and resources 
available to social actors. Interface analysis can also inform on organising processes of 
various social actors and thus help reveal how aid interventions both affect and are shaped 
by the way in which institutions evolve (Long 2001). 
Box 5. How do we look at livelihoods?
                                                                                                                                                 
Livelihood is a way to explain how people make a living. The concept became very 
popular in the 1990s, in response to the macro-economic approaches in the 1980s, 
in order to redirect attention to the challenges of how to approach the different 
aspects of livelihood practices on a micro-level. Livelihood approaches have become 
strongly associated with models, such as the famous DFID model, that incorporate 
material and non-material assets, or ‘capitals’ and capabilities which are present, 
and situate these in a framework that maps the opportunities and constraints that 
people encounter in making their living (Bebbington 1999, Chambers and Conway, 
1991). Compared to the restricted ways in which humanitarian relief portrays victims 
of crisis, livelihood approaches focus on people’s agency and form the foundation of 
participatory approaches in interventions (Kaag et al. 2004). Livelihood approaches 
centre on households within their immediate enabling or disabling environments.
The use of livelihood approaches can be problematic in practice for several reasons. 
Firstly, they may lead to static analyses of what households can do, and overlook the 
vagaries and fluidness of conditions in crisis situations. In times of increased risk 
and vulnerability, people need to constantly assess and re-assess what livelihoods 
strategies they can safely pursue (Lautze and Raven-Roberts 2006). Secondly, it 
has been observed that despite the comprehensive models underlying livelihood 
approaches, interventions often continue to reflect what Farrington (1998) has labeled 
the ‘yeoman farmer fallacy’, where every rural inhabitant in a developing country is 
assumed to be a subsistence farmer, informing the seeds-and-tools bias of many 
rural society reconstruction programming (Longley et al. 2006). This means that the 
diversification of livelihoods that is typical of poor people’s strategies may be ignored 
due to a focus on subsistence while overlooking entrepreneurial activities that are 
geared to accumulation and may affect social relations. It also means that the supra-
local interconnections in livelihood strategies - ranging from seasonal migration to 
international emigration - may be ignored. Finally, gender studies in particular have 
pointed out that livelihood approaches may overlook intra-household heterogeneity 
and power differentials. 
It is important to acknowledge how people’s livelihood strategies affect the 
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institutional environment that put boundaries on the room for manoeuvre of individual 
households. We need to conceptualize livelihood practices as ‘embedded action and 
of livelihood as fluid, moving with changing circumstances and responding to but 
also influencing external conditions’ (Kaag et al. p.55). At the same time, we need to 
understand how livelihoods are entangled with the institutional environment. It is 
often inaccurate to portrait poor people as simple bystanders or victims of ongoing 
upheaval. They are often involved (sometimes forcefully) in the ongoing social and 
political strife. Local communities may have (more or less hidden) ties with warring 
parties. A poor farmer may also be an occasional militia member for a specific group, 
or an important source of logistical support. The violence they have suffered, or 
partaken in, may be relevant to their political identification and loyalties, and affect 
their livelihood choice.2
The use of models in livelihood analyses are instrumental to mapping risks and 
opportunities, but fails to capture the processes by which these become effective 
and the meaning that people attach to them. People do not rationally calculate their 
options, but their considerations and preferences are mediated by their interpretations 
of these options and come about in the interaction of everyday life. Anthony 
Bebbington stated ‘Over and above the meaningfulness of a particular set of assets, 
then, there is a meaningfulness associated with the set of cultural practices made 
possible (or constrained) by the patterns of co-residence and absence linked to certain 
livelihood strategies’ (Bebbington 1999 pp. 2034). The interactive nature of livelihood 
choices and the agency people invest in organizing their daily lives cannot be captured 
by mapping exercises and underline the importance of ethnographic research in 
analysing livelihoods.
                                                                                                                                                  
Core	challenges	in	research	into	how	to	address	livelihoods	and	food	security	
in fragile states
Understanding of the nature of livelihoods and food security in fragile states has often 
been distorted by prevailing narratives about how people survive in severe conditions 
and also by tendencies to anchor hopes for recovery in ‘nostalgia’ for a pastoral romantic 
vision of the past. The criticisms of the LRRD continuum notwithstanding, it is not only 
the aid community that are prone to hopes and assumptions that recovery is about a linear 
return to normalcy. States and citizens enter into recovery with hopes that the structures 
of the past can be rebuilt, without awareness of how the conditions for strong states have 
changed during the period of the conflict. Grand irrigation schemes, parastatal marketing 
boards, state managed cooperatives and other accoutrements of the failed statist models of 
economic development from the 1970s are dusted off and presented by leaders who have 
spent decades fighting in the bush or otherwise isolated from current norms and the lessons 
that have been learnt in the interim. International and national NGOs, eager to avoid the 
mistakes of neoliberalism, promote projects that are disconnected from current market 
2 Based on comments by Ralph Sprenkels.
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realities in their efforts to revive rural economies that were in many cases crumbling even 
before the start of the conflict. 
This nostalgia may overshadow analyses of what fragile states can do to defend property 
rights, provide basic regulatory functions, etc., and what the implications are regarding the 
strategies of households and businesses if they cannot (or do not wish to) shoulder these 
tasks. Research into the role of the state needs to contrast expectations (of the state, the 
population and the aid agencies) with the capacities to actually manage basic responsibilities 
and how actors perceive and deal with the gap between the two. Analyses need to also 
consider the extent to which civil society and private sector institutions can fill the gap 
of limited state capacities. Points of departure for this analysis can include, for example, 
research into the role of farmer organisations and innovative interventions to deal with weak 
capacities, such as warehouse receipt systems wherein farmers can store their harvests with 
large commercial actors and thereby be able to access credit using this collateral and sell 
their products when prices are high. 
Another aspect of recovery where nostalgia may distort priorities is in understanding the 
implications of climate change for ‘building back better’. New knowledge about future trends 
and hazards suggests that many vulnerable populations, especially in drylands (in Africa) 
and areas where agriculture is dependent on glacial melt (e.g., Afghanistan and Nepal), will 
not be able to return to past livelihoods and may need to be encouraged to seek completely 
different opportunities. The capacities of fragile states, civil society, private sector actors and 
many of the international agencies engaged in recovery to incorporate these factors in their 
economic and food security strategies is often far from sufficient. This is indeed an emerging 
challenge to both conventional models of economic development and those promoting 
romantic reliance on ‘indigenous knowledge’ as an appropriate basis for local development 
models. 
At the same time, there is a lack of congruence between the high ambitions of new plans for 
climate change adaptation and mitigation and what is known about capacities within fragile 
states. Many of the climate related tasks that are being proposed assume that line ministries 
and frontline service provision, regulatory and research institutions exist and can exert their 
will to put into place very different systems for natural resource management. There are 
few fragile states where this assumption is valid, and environmental agencies are usually 
a relatively low priority for states that are struggling to manage their most basic functions. 
There is a strong statist bias in most climate change mitigation and adaptation plans, and 
there is little indication that these agendas, with very ambitious checklists of things that 
government ‘must do,’ are being modified to reflect current understanding of what fragile 
states ‘can do’. The gap between what can be done and assumptions about what ‘must’ be 
done is growing, and there are few signs of an equivalent to the ‘good enough governance’ 
concept emerging in climate change circles. 
In a similar vein, we see gaps evolving between systemic analyses of what must be done 
and insight in what local people actually do about their problems. Economic recovery and 
adaptation to climate change are largely shaped by the multiple ways in which people 
reflect upon their experiences and what happens around them and use their knowledge and 
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capabilities to interpret and respond to their environment. Household coping practices and 
the ways in which individual actors develop preferences and lifestyles, while seeking to adjust 
their livelihoods to changing opportunities and constraints, results in new mechanisms of 
social and economic ordering. One example is the preference of many returning refugees 
who have experienced camp life to base themselves in cities rather than resume the rural 
life of their parents. While many aid programmes are designed to promote the restoration of 
rural livelihoods, people-generated dynamics are often concentrated in informal economic 
processes that tie and reshape different urbanities and ruralities.
Relations	between	food	and	livelihood	insecurity	and	chronic	fragility
As noted above, concerns for food and livelihoods are beginning to figure in the new, 
emerging security agenda. Several factors shape the merging of these agendas. First, in 
countries as diverse as Kosovo and Afghanistan, the factors driving international interest in 
recovery are not entirely altruistic. The growth of smuggling, narcotics and organised crime 
are evidence that a failure to address livelihood and food security may lead to the pursuance 
of unsanctioned livelihoods instead, with impacts that transcend borders. State fragility is 
clearly a business opportunity (Cooper 2002). The income from unsanctioned economic 
activities sometimes flows into the coffers of unsanctioned political movements and attracts 
members to these movements. In light of this, the allure of programming to promote 
‘alternative livelihoods’ in fragile states is understandable. 
The rush to promote such ‘alternative livelihoods’ (or even ‘instant livelihoods’) before illicit 
livelihoods take root, has carried with it tendencies to ignore the realities of the markets for 
labour, services and products upon which the sustainability of these livelihoods will rely. 
Thousands of demobilised combatants (including child soldiers) are given quick training 
in skills shoe repair, carpentry and tie-dying with little attention to prospective job markets. 
Inputs are provided for small-scale peasant farming for urbanised populations who may 
have left agriculture generations ago and where commercial agriculture is putting the ‘real 
peasants’ out of business. 
In reaction to these mistakes, an alternative approach has emerged, focusing on 
investments, often very considerable, in entrepreneurs and farmers who have the land, 
knowledge and social capital to take advantage of prevailing opportunities (Christoplos 
2007b; Christoplos et al 2009 forthcoming). These programmes ‘pick winners’ with 
assumptions that this will lead to a trickle-down effect that create livelihoods for the 
chronic poor who would be lured into undesirable occupations and political movements. 
They are also sometimes justified as making the best of a bad situation by at least helping 
‘somebody’, which it is assumed will eventually lead to broader economic development, 
which will in turn lead to stronger state capacities and a virtuous cycle that will eventually 
result in better livelihoods for those who are excluded at first. There has been insufficient 
wider, ex post evaluation and research into whether or not these assumptions have proven 
valid. Little is known about whether policies that focus on ‘picking winners’ create such a 
trickle-down effect or if they exclude ‘losers’ even in the long-term, and thereby aggravate 
security concerns. 
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The belief in ‘picking winners’ is rooted in assumptions that ‘economic development solves 
everything,’ i.e., that attention to targeting and vulnerability distracts from the need to 
address the overall lack of licit economic dynamism in fragile states. It is difficult to dispute 
the claim that addressing fragility is contingent on economic development. However, there 
is clear evidence that economic development alone is not sufficient for addressing the 
underlying factors that make fragile states fragile. Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo and East 
Timor are examples of countries which have achieved fairly strong economic growth, but 
where massive unemployment still threatens stability and has resulted in ingrained poverty 
(Christoplos 2007b). The ‘economic development solves everything’ narrative can lead to 
exclusion. 
Food	security	and	state	fragility
A political perspective on food insecurity starts with the analysis of its causes. It has been 
argued that famine is not in the first place a failure of some kind (of food-supply, livelihood 
systems or climate), but the normal outcome of economic and political processes. David 
Keen starts his analysis of food crises in Sudan with a question about the beneficiaries of 
famine: its perpetrators and bystanders (Keen, 1994; see also Duffield, 1993). Alex de Waal 
brought this approach powerfully home by labelling famine as a crime (de Waal, 1997). 
It might seem that ensuring food security is in many respects the most visible and 
fundamental indicator of whether or not fragile states and the international community 
are meeting their most basic responsibilities. This is surprisingly not the case in the 
overwhelming majority of research on fragile states. Until 2008, food security was generally 
ignored in research into fragile states or was treated as a mundane and technical task for 
humanitarian agencies. With concerns about the political impacts of rising food prices and 
their wider impact (e.g., land grabbing, urban food riots, etc.) this may be changing. Also, 
there are growing concerns about potential ecological ‘tipping points’ wherein climate 
change may lead to sudden collapse of food production systems, particularly in conflict-
prone arid and semi-arid areas. 
A major point of confusion in analysing the importance of food is that the term food security 
is used by different actors to mean different things. The humanitarian community focuses 
mostly on household food security and nutrition, whereas national politicians are often more 
concerned with national-level supplies and ensuring a modicum of food price stability for 
urban populations. The global food price crisis of 2008 drew attention to overall global food 
supply. 
 The antecedents of the current discourse on food security stem from the late 1980s when, 
due to the impacts of droughts in Africa and concerns about the nature of famine, food 
availability and consumption were being compromised by many of the factors that may 
have been early forms of climate change. Yet at the same time, the focus was shifting away 
from increasing yields to understanding the complex nature of hunger and famines. As 
mentioned above, Amartya Sen and Alex de Waal drew attention to how famine resulted, not 
from a lack of food in a given region, but rather from political decisions and the structures of 
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vulnerability that led to a lack of ‘entitlements’ by marginalised populations to gain access to 
the food they need. Such entitlements could consist of income, access to social protection 
or smallholder production. Sen showed that food exports always increase from famine 
affected areas, largely because poor people cannot afford to buy food. He concluded that 
increasing global food supply is not a panacea for famine. The broader ‘freedom’ to buy food, 
as influenced by local/national/international policies, markets and trends, was recognized as 
more important than household or even national production levels. 
Recent events have swung the pendulum partially back toward food security and increasing 
yields, this time linked to the political security agenda. Food prices that skyrocketed during 
2007-2008 and which are likely to remain volatile have underlined how the bottom line 
in the livelihoods of the poor is being able to afford enough to eat. The global forces that 
determine the nature of today’s agrifood systems are clashing with the expectations of the 
poor, and food is the most incendiary factor. International security is reliant on how states 
manage this interface. Food security is a determinant of whether or not the state is viewed as 
living up to its most basic responsibilities. In many Asian countries, the most fundamental 
indicator of the social compact between the state and its population is perceived as being 
whether or not there is enough rice available at an affordable price. In Mexico, increases 
in the price of tortillas have led to riots. In other countries different staples have become a 
symbol of access to a minimum level of well-being. Evidence indicates that people perceive 
that they have a right to food, especially a right to have enough food for their children, which 
in many respects transcends the livelihoods concept. The violent reactions to the food crisis 
have shown that food security is not just an indicator of the sustainability of livelihoods; it is 
even a determinant of social and political stability. Thus, food security is a strategic interface 
between international efforts to address geo-political and human insecurity and the struggles 
of individuals, households and communities to survive. 
Until the late 1990s there was an assumption that humanitarian assistance for agriculture 
was, ipso facto, a matter of distributing seeds, tools and occasionally fertiliser. This type of 
programming grew along with the interest in LRRD as food aid was associated with relief 
and seeds were seen as being an easily managed and popular (among donors) symbol of 
commitment to rehabilitation. This narrow ‘quick fix’ for food security has been increasingly 
questioned on a number of grounds (Longley, et al 2006, Christoplos 2007a). These include 
concerns about the lack of evidence in most cases that local seed markets had actually 
collapsed, fears that seeds were being imported that were inappropriate for local conditions 
(particularly the micro-conditions within farms and localities), and the lack of competence 
of many agencies promoting ‘improved’ seed varieties about regarding whether or not 
such improvements are appropriate from for the farming systems of the poor. Perhaps 
most important Furthermore, seed programmes have been promoted as a way of reaching 
the poorest, whereas a large proportion of the rural poor are landless and therefore have 
little use for seeds, improved or otherwise. Those who sharecrop may benefit, but there 
have even been reports that landowners have reduced the share of the harvest retained by 
sharecroppers in accordance with their lower input costs due to free seeds. 
One alternative response to the realisation that food and economic security could not be 
effectively addressed by either food or seeds alone has been a trend to provide cash to 
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those affected by a disaster or emergency. There are a range of justifications for this new 
programming modality, perhaps the most important being that cash allows recipients to 
decide how to use these resources themselves. At the same time, it has been pointed out 
that cash relief should not become the new standard mantra of humanitarian action, as its 
appropriateness is contextual and depends, amongst others, on the prevailing economic 
conditions and security situations. (Levine and Chastre, 2004)
Labour	markets	and	economic	security	in	fragile	states
The interest in livelihoods in fragile states brought with it a realisation that labour markets 
are probably more important than seeds for food security, not the least for the landless 
(Pain & Lautze 2002). The need to take into account labour markets is partially a result of 
recognition of entitlements and partially an awareness of the limitations of the ‘yeoman 
farmer fallacy’ (Farrington), i.e., a misguided tendency to assume that the rural poor are/
should be/want to be small-scale peasant farmers. Massive migration to urban areas and 
rural landlessness would seem to be obvious indications that rural people have other goals, 
but fixed assumptions about poverty and rurality still guide most recovery efforts. 
There are many examples of how recovery investments, even in countries still in conflict, 
have transformed labour markets in unexpected ways. The recovery process has generated 
a demand for labour in some fragile states that has led to an influx of labourers from 
neighbouring areas (Sri Lanka in areas affected by the tsunami, see Christoplos 2006), 
neighbouring countries (from Pakistan to Afghanistan, see Christoplos 2004) and has 
increased wage levels vis-à-vis neighbouring countries to the point that some agricultural 
activities are no longer profitable (Bosnia Herzegovina, see Christoplos 2007b) Despite this 
recognition there has been little empirical analysis of how aid impacts on labour markets. 
There is acknowledgement that labour markets may be important, but it has not led to a 
significant rethink on the role of aid in fragile states.
Remittances are a vital resource during and after conflict for those struggling to survive and 
rebuild their livelihoods. These financial flows are often greater than the money from grants 
and loans provided by the international community. Despite being increasingly recognised 
as important, these flows are largely invisible in planning for economic and food security. In 
many countries social and economic divides emerge between those with and without access 
to remittances. Apart from generally creating an enabling environment for investment in 
livelihoods, there is little that the aid community can do to influence these financial flows or 
to channel them differently. It is important, however, that planning be informed by a more 
holistic understanding of where and how capital is being generated for investments. Greater 
humility about the relative importance of aid is a starting point for understanding the reality 
of economic and food security in fragile states. 
The parallel processes of climate change and increasing state fragility
Another global factor impacting on fragility and socio-economic security is, as mentioned 
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above, that of climate change, both with respect to impacts of climate change itself and also 
the impacts of climate change mitigation and adaptation investments on the architecture of 
aid and development. Particularly in drylands, in countries reliant on Himalayan snows and 
glacier melt for agriculture (Afghanistan, Nepal) and in central Africa there is large overlap 
between state fragility and current/expected climate change. There is, however, a danger in 
generalisations. The intensification of conflict in Darfur has coincided with a return of higher 
levels of rainfall after a long period of drought (Young et al 2009). Southern Somalia has 
experienced disasters due to flooding as well as drought in recent years. The only certain 
trend for many areas is that of greater climate variability (and uncertainty). There has been 
some speculation on the interlinkages between these factors, but little empirical research. 
Adaptation investments are therefore needed, but the most vulnerable countries are also 
the countries with least capacity to engage in discussions on climate change adaptation, 
much less carry out the increasingly ambitious measures being promoted internationally or 
deal with the uncertainties that accompany recognition of climate change. The capacities 
of authorities to manage such investments at national level are extremely limited, with 
environmental issues rarely being a priority for either fragile states or for donors investing 
in post-conflict programmes. Both lean toward views that livelihoods come first, the 
environment later. Decentralised capacities within agricultural and public works ministries 
are a precondition to state engagement in addressing increasing risks of floods and 
droughts, but these are rarely present. New ideas for risk transfer, relying on long-term and 
predictable commitments to co-finance and manage index-based insurance programmes and 
related schemes are likely to be equally problematic given the fact that these programmes 
have a poor track record even in relatively stable contexts (Arnold 2008). 
When new climate change mitigation architecture is put into place, this may lead to struggles 
over access to resources that are essential for livelihoods since payments for environmental 
services involve a commoditisation of natural resources that have traditionally been managed 
on a common property basis. These mechanisms, such as the programme for Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD), 
are frequently portrayed within the climate change community as ‘low hanging fruit’, i.e., 
easy to implement (Früling & Warfvinge 2008). This disregards decades of experience and 
research on how efforts to undertake attractive concepts such as ‘community forestry’ can 
unleash a range of natural resource conflicts at local, national and sometimes even global 
levels. Lessons could be drawn from analyses of how ‘green wars’ resulting from a rush to 
exploit natural resources create state fragility (see, e.g., Di John 2006). These and other new 
global norms and market institutions mean there is no return to the strong states of old. 
A transnational perspective is needed in order to understand how local natural resource 
management and agricultural production systems are likely to change and ‘develop’ in a 
post-conflict, chronic conflict or post-disaster recovery phase.
Growing populations, urbanisation and geographic concentration of economic development 
activities are trends that are universal to fragile and non-fragile states alike. The impacts 
of climate change on coastal cities and the financial crisis on urban economies are also 
affecting both. The increasing pressures on land and other natural resources mentioned 
above are by no means unique to fragile states. Cultural transformations are underway 
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throughout the world. These transformations are strongly affected by the presence of chronic 
conflict and heightened tensions related to age, ethnicity, gender and other factors in fragile 
states, but these transformations are underway on a much broader scale. In light of these 
factors it is essential that fragile states are not treated as a discrete category where everything 
is attributed to the conflict, narco-mafias or other factors specifically related to fragility.
These broader factors, together with climate change, are impacting on the changing 
landscape of disaster risk and the capacities of households and governments to manage 
natural hazards. These geo-physical factors, together with demographic and natural resource 
pressures are leading to a loss of biodiversity and with that increasing risk due to the 
undermining of people to effectively manage their ecosystems.
Within the climate change community there are growing concerns that the convergence of 
these different factors are leading to approaching ‘tipping points’, where states and socio-
economic systems are no longer able to adapt, and therefore fail. It can be presumed that 
some collapsed states, such as Somalia, may be a demonstration of what happens after 
such tipping points have been reached. At the same time, it may be possible to learn about 
the nature of resilience by observing how households, businesses and states deal with the 
tipping point of state failure. This could inform the frequently deterministic and generally 
empirically weak discourse within the climate change community about how people actually 
deal with profound shocks and develop new livelihoods to adapt to the changing conditions.
The proof is in the pudding 
There may be ‘no peace without development’ but development, if too narrowly defined may 
not lead to peace. If economic development is to result in relatively inclusive economic and 
food security, this will require targeted and empirically informed strategies for how to invest 
the ‘peace dividend.’ This means that there should be a new perspective on the roles of the 
state, civil society and the private sector, which includes active consideration of options for 
new and innovative reforms, but which is cognisant and respectful of the expectations and 
desires of national and local actors. Socio-economic security is contingent on a rebuilt social 
contract, and that contract will be determined as much by local social, cultural and economic 
norms and trends as by models from abroad.
Food and livelihood security are the ultimate proof of whether the fragile states concept is 
just a buzz word or something that actually provides guidance on how to achieve impact. The 
IS Academy can illustrate and enhance understanding of this link and raise critical questions 
about the extent to which current thinking has really transcended reductionist models, such 
as the LRRD continuum, to provide more informed, iterative and flexible approaches which 
reflect local realities. Undue faith in the LRRD continuum lies behind much of the optimism 
regarding trickle-down development as it can give the impressions that once things are 
‘on the right path,’ socio-economic security is virtually inevitable. Measurement of what 
is happening in livelihoods and in households’ food security can provide a reality check 
regarding whether or not this is really happening. 
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economic and food security in fragile states
 The processes underway in fragile societies are not chaotic. They lead to a certain 
level of market functionality and socio-economic organisation. These may be 
strongly influenced by transnational and global trajectories and effective strategies 
to promote livelihoods and address economic and food security should reflect a 
recognition and respect, (without however romanticizing them), for the nature of 
these ordering processes.
•	 Competing	claims	on	entitlements	to	resources	and	power	frame	fragility
 Different groups of actors compete within and contest these processes, including 
political structures, civil servants, private sector, informal community institutions, 
civil society actors including religious actors, households and aid agencies. 
It is primarily in the nature of this competition, rather than in the design of 




 The actions of authorities towards economic recovery, by enabling measures to 
enhance development as well as by addressing disabling factors and processes, 
may largely determine the legitimacy of authorities in the eyes of local people. 
•	 Aid interventions are spaces where different actors manoeuvre to realize their own 
projects 
 The study of aid interventions must be grounded in understanding how aid fits 
into people’s lifeworlds, strategies and livelihoods. They do not just ‘cope’ with the 
fragile nature of the states in which they live. They use aid to proactively construct 
systems, social relations and market structures that reflect what they perceive to be 
opportunities for both immediate survival and long-term sustainability.
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•	 Interventions	are	always	political,	if	not	intentional,	indeed	in	their	effects
 Aid interventions are, sometimes deliberately but always effectively, anchored 
in political, economic and socio-cultural processes underway in any locality or 
nation. Research should reflect the ways that different categories of aid - across 
continuums and contiguums - impact on the political processes that are underway 
in their midst. 
Methodological issues
•	 The	need	for	empirical	research	to	break	out	of	the	current	discursive	impasse
 The history of different fashions in conceptual models for describing both fragile 
states and the types of interventions that are applied within them make clear 
that we do not need more labels. What is needed is empirical research which 
unpacks the actual processes underway within these different headings. Multi-actor 
perspectives	are	essential,	i.e.,	research	must	have	a	very	different	ambition	than	project	
evaluation and transcend aid categories.
 The growth of aid evaluation has been highly beneficial in starting to loosen 
the blinkers that prevent aid agencies from looking beyond the confines of their 
projects. But the demands of accountability have meant that evaluation and other 
forms of aid review cannot escape a significant degree of bias toward emphasis 
on finding (and perhaps exaggerating) causal relations between interventions and 
impact. Research is needed with can provide a multi-actor perspective to transcend 
this tunnel vision. There is potential for a synergetic relationship between the work 
of the IS Academy and aid reviews in that the latter can provide valuable data and 
even open doors and ask intriguing questions about the local and transnational 
processes in which aid becomes intertwined.
•	 Exploring	the	meso-level	is	a	strategic	entry	point	for	analysing	wider	processes
 The issues highlighted in this paper encompass a far larger research agenda than 
what can be undertaken by the IS Academy. It is suggested that the main niche of 
the IS Academy should be to start with meso-level analyses of the construction 
of economic and food security in order to link bottom-up research on household 
and community practices with analysis of national and transnational trends 
and policies. There are several reasons for this focus. The meso-level is often 
an important political hub where - due to lack of central control- large room for 
manoeuvre exists for public and private actors. Local economies are tied into 
markets and migration patterns beyond the locality, and district towns are usually 
vibrant centres of recovery. Perhaps most importantly, the meso-level is a major 
gap in current research and in indeed in intervention practice. Impact evaluation 
tends to focus on micro-level impacts on ‘beneficiaries’, whereas the majority of the 
academic discourse has focused on the macro processes of state formation. The 
meso-level has received insufficient attention thus far.
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